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The Major Nicholson Incident and the Norms
of Peacetime Espionage
Michael R. Shebelskiet
Against the background of this luminous and sparkling stage Bond stood
in the sunshine and felt his mission to be incongruous and remote and his
dark profession an affront to his fellow actors.
Ian Flemingtt
I. Problem
On March 24, 1985, a Soviet sentry shot and killed Major Arthur
Nicholson, an American intelligence officer stationed at the U.S. liaison
mission in Potsdam, East Germany (GDR). Acting under a military
agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States,I Major Nich-
olson was on an intelligence gathering mission in the GDR. Although
Soviet troops had threatened and harassed Western liaison officers
before,2 Major Nicholson was the first liaison officer shot dead. Given
that the Soviet Union perceived Major Nicholson's actions as a grave
threat, it is surprising that the Soviet Union3 did not retaliate more fully
against the United States. It is even more surprising that the United
States did not strongly protest the shooting.
The outcome of this incident shapes state behavior with respect to mil-
itary liaison espionage on two levels. First, the incident concerns the
degree to which target states can hold gathering states-states authoriz-
ing acts of espionage-responsible for the espionage of their agents. Sec-
ond, this incident questions the degree of force that a target state can use
t J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
tt I. FLEMING, CASINo ROYALE 47 (1954).
1. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
3. Although the shooting occurred in the GDR, the Soviet Union and the United States
are the primary participating elites because the U.S. military liaison officers are accredited
directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet army stationed in the GDR. See infra note
48 and accompanying text.
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against individual spies4 to prevent espionage. Currently, international
law provides ambiguous answers to both of these questions. However, a
brief analysis of these conflicting norms is necessary to assess the
incident.
A. Responsibility of the Gathering State for Peacetime Espionage
Although most authorities agree that espionage is a legitimate ruse df
war,5 they are divided as to whether peacetime espionage is "legal," i.e.,
whether peacetime espionage constitutes a wrong for which the target
state can hold the gathering state responsible. If the target state cannot
hold the gathering state responsible, then the target state can take only
limited diplomatic retaliation against the gathering state.
Many commentators believe that peacetime espionage is unlawful.
They argue that the legitimacy of wartime espionage is premised on a
belligerent's lack of duty to respect the territory of its opponent. During
peacetime, however, a state must respect the territorial integrity of other
states. An act of espionage directly contravenes this duty.6 Further-
more, a diplomat's violation of a receiving state's espionage laws consti-
tutes illegal interference in the affairs of the receiving state.7 Supporters
of this position also argue that by limiting the available inter-state re-
sponses, this norm inadequately protects the security interests of the tar-
4. Oppenheim defines spies as "secret agents of a State sent abroad for the purpose of
obtaining clandestinely information in regard to military or political secrets." 1 L. OPPEN-
HEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 455, at 673 (5th ed. 1937).
5. See, eg., 6 G. HAcKwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 581, at 304-06
(1943); W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 188, at 578 (1917); H. HALLECK, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 406 (1861); 7 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1132, at 232
(1906); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 159, at 422 (7th ed. 1948). See also Con-
vention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature Oct. 18,
1907, Annex art. 24, 36 Stat. 2277, 2302, T.S. No. 539, at 32 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Convention]. But see 3 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 677, at 1865 (2d rev. ed. 1945) ("conduct of a spy is in
reality at variance with the laws of war which are a part of the law of nations").
6. See Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 28
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 329 (1951); Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 67 (1984); Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in
InternalAffairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 11-12 (R. Stanger ed.
1962); Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 849 (1960).
7. Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, in ESSAYS ON
ESPIONAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 32-35 (R. Stanger ed. 1962). Recently, Liberia ex-
pelled the entire Soviet mission stationed there for acts of espionage that constituted "gross
interference" in its internal affairs. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ExPLUsiONS OF SOVIETS WORLD-





get state. Instead, a strong inter-state response is needed to deter the
incidence of peacetime espionage.
8
On the other hand, other scholars believe that peacetime espionage is
lawful.9 Proponents of the legality of peacetime espionage defend their
position on the-basis of necessity 0 and self-defense.'1 They also assert
that since accredited diplomats are properly admitted into the target
state, their presence cannot constitute trespass regardless of what they
do.
12
Despite this scholarly division, target states rarely hold gathering
states responsible for their peacetime espionage. Although states may
purport that espionage is unlawful, elaborate operational codes of behav-
ior govern their actions.13 The target state usually lodges a mild protest,
and the gathering state issues a pro forma denial. Target states rarely
demand an apology and compensation. Thus, peacetime espionage does
not seriously disrupt diplomatic relations. 14 In two celebrated espionage
8. See, e.g., Note, Espionage in Transnational Law, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 434, 441
(1972) (rules of land warfare lack international framework for providing minimum security
against espionage); Delupis, supra note 6, at 70-71 (arguing that both the gathering state and
the spy should be held responsible under international law).
9. See, eg., N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 264 (1973); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL CON-
FLICT 563 (1954); Stone, supra note 7, at 39-40. Oppenheim's definition of a spy, see supra
note 4, does not differentiate between wartime and peacetime; therefore, his observation that it
is not "wrong morally, politically, or legally" for a state to use spies applies equally to peace-
time. Id.
Others condition the legality of peacetime espionage on the absence of an accompanying
delict such as the destruction of property. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The Intelligence
Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 365, 393-94 (1973). However, it is the
accompanying delict and not the espionage per se that constitutes the wrong. Thus, espionage
is a legitimate state activity, even if accompanied by a nondelictual use of force. Id. at 418-19.
10. Oppenheim legitimates espionage during war by arguing for the necessity of military
intelligence for the waging of war. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 422. Intelligence is also
needed for the successful waging of peace. Thus the United States partially justified the U-2
spy flights over the Soviet Union as the only means of obtaining information it needed to
maintain the balance of power. Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in
Internal Affairs, supra note 6, at 17-18.
11. Delupis, supra note 6, at 68; Coyle, Surveillance From the High Seas, 60 MIL. L. REv.
75, 92-93 (1973). The United States also asserted that the U-2 flights were necessary to pre-
vent a surprise attack. Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal
Affairs, supra note 6, at 17-19; Note, Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer
Space, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1074, 1095-1100 (1961).
12. See Note, supra note 11, at 1100 n.144.
13. In every legal order, expectations are shaped by both a "myth system" and an "opera-
tional code." Myth systems represent the norms expressed in rhetoric and ideals. Operational
codes refer to the norms as practiced by elites. Both levels of expectations influence behavior
in legal systems. See W. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS 15-17
(1979).
14. Note, supra note 8, at 445-46. Sometimes the target state does not even publicize its
actions. See EXPULSIONS OF SOVIETS, supra note 7. In one of the rare examples of disrupted
relations, the Canadian government closed the Soviet mission in Ottawa after discovering a
major Soviet spy ring. However, Canada never labelled the spying a wrong or requested repa-
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incidents-the U-2 incident and the U.S.S. Pueblo incident-the United
States acknowledged that it had authorized espionage against the Soviet
Union and North Korea respectively. In both instances, however, the
target state did not say that the U.S. had committed a wrong because it
had committed espionage. Rather, its attack focused on other aspects of
international law, such as sovereignty over air space and the law of the
sea.'5 This reluctance to disavow the legitimacy of peacetime espionage
suggests that the relevant elites do not view peacetime espionage as a
wrong under international law.
B. Protection of the Spy
Traditional sources of international law also present conflicting norms
concerning the appropriate force a target state can use against a spy.
1. Norms Providing Protection to State Agents
Diplomatic immunity and the rules of warfare provide a basis for the
protection of persons identifiable as state agents who commit espio-
nage. 16 These norms prohibit the target state's use of force against such
spies. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations accords absolute
immunity to diplomats for their private acts as well as for acts in their
official capacity. 17 Although observation is a traditional diplomatic func-
tion, 18 a diplomat must respect the laws of the receiving state and is not
entitled to commit espionage.1 9 However, if a diplomat commits espio-
nage, he does not sacrifice his immunity. The receiving state can expel
rations from the Soviet Union. See Cohen, Espionage and Immunity-Some Recent Problems
and Developments, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 404, 406-08 (1948).
15. Note, supra note 8, at 446. See also Stone, supra note 7, at 39 (states refuse to accept
responsibility for their spies not because espionage is illegal but because state affirmation would
not advantage the gathering state).
16. See Delupis, supra note 6, at 69 ("[W]e have found no cases where state agents, acting
openly as such, have had to assume individual responsibility for acts of espionage.").
17. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, art.
29, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 14, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 110 [hereinafter cited as
Vienna Convention] ("The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be
liable to any form of arrest or detention."). Customary international law long recognized this
immunity. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 386; 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES §§ 433-34 (2d rev. ed.
1945). See also Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 609,
609-19 (1980) (diplomatic immunity under Islamic law). The United States and the Soviet
Union also extend personal inviolability to their consular officials. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular
Convention, June 1, 1964, art. 19, 19 U.S.T. 5018, 5031, T.I.A.S. No. 6503, at 29.
18. E. DENZA, DIPLOMATc LAW 21 (1976). Observation encompasses the transmittal of
all information, both public and classified, to the sending state. McDougal, Lasswell & Reis-
man, supra note 9, at 380-81.
19. See Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 41. Article 3(d) provides that the functions
of a diplomat include "ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the
receiving State. . . ." (emphasis added).
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him, demand his recall, or petition the sending state to waive his immu-
nity, but it can neither try nor punish him.2 0 Although the receiving
state can temporarily detain a diplomat to prevent him from committing
a crime,2 1 it cannot exact punishment under the guise of preventing ile-
gal acts.
Consistent with these norms, the Soviet Union and the United States
tolerate a considerable amount of legation-based espionage. Although
Soviet bloc countries occasionally arrest Western diplomats simply in or-
der to harass them, 2 by and large the Soviet Union respects diplomatic
immunity. It detains U.S. diplomats allegedly caught committing espio-
nage but promptly expels them unharmed. 23 The U.S. accords the same
treatment to Soviet diplomats.2 4
Similarly, military forces receive considerable immunity in peacetime.
Target states cannot retaliate against warships and their crews commit-
ting espionage on the high seas.25 Furthermore, warships and their
crews are immune from legal process for intelligence gathering done in a
coastal state's territorial waters. 26 In addition, the armed forces of a for-
eign state generally receive immunity during peacetime based on custom
and treaty as visiting friendly forces. In fact, the territorial state's con-
sent to the presence of foreign armed forces could constitute an implied
waiver of jurisdiction.27
20. The Vienna Convention provides that "[w]ithoutprejudice to their privileges and immu-
nities it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws
and regulations of the receiving State." Id. art. 41. See also E. DENZA, supra note 18, at 263-
65; Bassiouni, supra note 17, at 616, 623-25 (espionage does not forfeit immunity under Islamic
law). The United States has interpreted this as preserving immunity despite the commission of
espionage. See, e.g., United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554, 566-67 (3d Cir. 1967), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Soviet attaches re-
tain diplomatic immunity against espionage charge).
21. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 388; 2 C. Hyde, supra note 17, § 442.
22. See Ling, A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations
Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of Diplo-
matic Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 104 (1976).
23. For recent examples of this practice, see "Espionage" Acts by U.S. Attaches Noted,
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service [hereinafter cited as FBIS] (USSR), Mar. 31, 1985,
at Al (text from Krasnaya Zvezda); U.S. Vice Counsel Detained for "Espionage Act," FBIS
(USSR), Mar. 31, 1985, at Al (text from Krasnaya Zvezda); U.S. Vice Counsel Detained for
"Espionage Act," FBIS (USSR), Sept. 13, 1983, at Al (Tass report).
24. For a listing of Soviet diplomats expelled since 1970, see EXPULSIONS OF SOVIETS,
supra note 7, at 4-6.
25. See Coyle, supra note 11, at 80-81.
26. See id. at 95; Delupis, supra note 6, at 55-57, 71-75. The United States accepts the
right of innocent passage for all ships; the Soviet position concerning warships is uncertain.
Coyle, supra note 11, at 85-86.
27. See, eg., Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from Supervisory Jurisdiction, 26
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 380, 387 (1949); King, Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces,
36 AM. J. INT'L L. 539 (1942). Some writers suggest that armed forces enjoy immunity from
local jurisdiction in peacetime even if their presence is without the consent of the territorial
state. See Delupis, supra note 6, at 55 & note 10.
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The rules of war also protect soldiers who commit espionage.28 A sol-
dier in uniform or clearly indentifiable as such must be treated as a pris-
oner of war (POW) even if captured while committing espionage.
29
Furthermore, if a soldier successfully completes an act of espionage by
rejoining the army to which he belongs and is later captured, the target
state cannot punish him for his prior espionage. Instead, it must treat
him as a POW.3o Even soldiers who commit espionage while not in uni-
form receive some limited protection. For example, target states must
provide a trial before punishing disguised combatants accused of
espionage.3
1
28. For example, Professor Baxter has delineated three categories of intelligence gathering:
legal with the participants protected, legal without protection for the participants, and illegal
with the participants entitled to punishment. He argues that emerging norms place espionage
by state agents, including soldiers, in the first category. Baxter, supra note 6, at 332-33.
29. See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 29 ("soldiers not wearing a disguise who
have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining
information, are not considered spies"); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 160. McKinney
refers to the analogous situation of balloonists reconnoitering enemy lines during the Franco-
Prussian War. These missions were conducted by soldiers in uniform and in vessels with dis-
tinctive military insignia. Even though France and Germany disagreed as to whether balloon-
ists were spies, subsequent state practice accorded them a protected status. McKinney, Spies
and Traitors, 12 ILL. L. REV. 591, 595-96 (1918).
Some writers label these soldiers "scouts" or "spying state agents" to indicate their pro-
tected status. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 423; Delupis, supra note 6, at 62. Others
contend, however, that since false pretense is an independent criterion of a spy, a soldier in
uniform can still be treated as a spy. For example, if a soldier comes behind enemy lines under
a flag of truce but with the intent to discover the enemy's weaknesses, his false pretense would
be sufficient to justify his being treated as a spy. Halleck, Military Espionage, 5 AM. J. INT'L
L. 590, 598 (1911).
For the protections accorded POWs, see generally Convention (III) Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
30. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 31; Baxter, supra note 6, at 331-32; W. HALL,
supra note 5, at 580.
31. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 30. During the war trials following World War
II, the Allies executed certain persons for ordering or taking part in the executions of alleged
spies without a trial. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 161, at 424. This protection extends to
civilians as well. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 3520, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, at 575 U.N.T.S. 287, 293
(civilians detained for espionage are to be treated with humanity and provided a fair and regu-
lar trial). Furthermore, espionage is not triable as a war crime under international law. See
Delupis, supra note 6, at 68. But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (suggesting that
espionage is a war crime).
The trial requirement may also limit the target state's right to use force to capture a spy. If
a target state could recklessly shoot to kill persons allegedly committing espionage, then the
trial requirement would be meaningless. Cf. Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in
Recent Practice and International Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 559, 587 (1953) (aerial intruders
known to be unarmed should not be fired upon even if they ignore orders to land). This
contention is particularly salient since peacetime espionage often entails an aerial intrusion.
However, the trial requirement only minimally restricts the target state's ability to punish a
spy, for summary military procedures satisfy the trial requirement. J. STONE, supra note 9, at
562-63; Baxter, supra note 6, at 340, 343-44. Furthermore, foreign nationals awaiting trial as
spies are not entitled to the assistance of consular officials. L. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND
PRACTICE 125 (1961). In fact, since the Hague Convention applies only to land warfare, there
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2. Norms Permitting Retaliation Against a Spy
In contrast to the immunity accorded state agents, other sources of
international law emphasize the target state's need to control the flow of
classified information and permit the use of considerable force to protect
this information from spies. 32 First, international law recognizes a state's
right to promulgate espionage laws. 33 For example, both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. have enacted legislation proscribing espionage.34 Both
states have recognized the other's right to enforce that legislation. Thus
the U.S. never objected to the trial and imprisonment of Gary Powers in
the U-2 incident, and the Soviet Union did not object to the trial of Colo-
nel Rudolph Abel.
35
Second, the rules of war permit the target state to punish spies.
Soldiers caught committing espionage in disguise are not entitled to
POW status and can be executed. 36 Furthermore, because the target
state can punish spies under its municipal espionage laws, their espionage
need not consitute a wrong by the gathering state in order for the target
state to execute them.
may not exist a duty to provide a trial in peacetime. Cf. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 210,
at 509 (no duty to provide trial for espionage in naval warfare).
32. Oppenheim writes:
[Spies] have, of course, no recognized position whatever according to International Law,
since they are not official agents of States for the purpose of international relations. Every
State punishes them severely if they are caught committing an act which is a crime by the
law of the land, or expels them if they cannot be punished.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4. However, this treatment is justified as a forfeiture during war,
McKinney, supra note 29, at 595-601, and as a deterrent to behavior dangerous to the target
state, Baxter, supra note 6, at 329, and not because espionage is "illegal" under international
law.
33. Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, supra note
6, at 12-13.
34. The U.S. statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1982). The Soviet statute provides:
The giving away, theft or collection with the intention of conveying to a foreign Power, a
foreign organization, or their agents, of information constituting a State or military secret,
as well as the giving, away or collection on behalf of the institutions of foreign intelligence
agencies of other information to be used against the interests of the U.S.S.R., if the espio-
nage is committed by a foreigner or by a stateless person-is punishable by deprivation of
liberty for a period of from seven to fifteen years with confiscation of property, or by death
and confiscation of property.
Law on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes, art. 2, reprinted in Ward, Espionage and the
Forfeiture of Diplomatic Immunity, 11 IN'L LAW. 657, 663 n.46 (1977). This statute
criminalizes the collection and dissemination by a non-Soviet of any information "to be used
against the interests of the U.S.S.R." whether or not the information is a military secret.
35. Lissitzyn, Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents, 56 AM. J. INT'L L.
135, 135-36 (1962).
36. See, eg., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 161; W. HALL, supra note 5, at 579. Hal-
leek argues that a state can execute a spy even without municipal espionage laws. Halleck,
supra note 29, at 590. But see J. STONE, supra note 9, at 563 (arguing that execution should be
limited to exceptional cases).
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Third, a target state can use lethal force in peacetime to protect classi-
fied information, for a protest to the gathering state after the fact will
often fail to protect the target state's security. The use of lethal force in
peacetime can also be justified as self-defense. Because espionage can ex-
pose military weaknesses, the use of force can be seen as an appropriate
proportional response to prevent aggression.3 7 Thus, the immunity in
peacetime of warships and their crews extends only to legal process. It
does not preclude the coastal state from taking proportional military
measures in self-defense.3 8 Further, any duty to warn the spy before the
use of force is arguably subject to a standard of reasonableness. If so, a
warning may be unnecessary if it allows the spy to escape.39 Nor does
the use of force to prevent spying constitute a wrong to the gathering
state4°-at least if the target state's territory is violated.
41
Finally, states are allowed to provide non-diplomatic personnel with
only functional immunity.42 Functional immunity provides immunity
only for those acts done in the performance of the agent's official du-
37. McKinney, supra note 29, at 600-01. See also Note, supra note 11, at 1078 (permissible
to fire upon an aerial intruder that ignores a clear warning).
38. Delupis, supra note 6, at 72-74. Coyle argues that immunity was premised on "inno-
cent passage" and that a warship sacrificed its immunity if it "disturbs the peace" of the
coastal state. The collection of information with the intent to use it adversely to the interests
of the coastal state suffices to forfeit immunity. Coyle, supra note 11, at 81, 95. Delupis ar-
gues, however, that the coastal state is limited to an inter-state response and that it cannot
retaliate against the crew even if the warship acts in a threatening manner. Delupis, supra note
6, at 57.
The U.S.S. Pueblo incident indicates that immunity for warships is subject to the self-defense
of the coastal state. On January 23, 1968, North Korea seized the U.S.S. Pueblo, an intelli-
gence ship registered in the U.S. Navy. Even though the ship was in international waters when
seized, North Korea detained the crew for nearly a year and never returned the ship. Rubin,
Some Legal Implications of the Pueblo Incident, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 961, 961-62 (1969).
For a similar incident, see generally J. ENNES, ASSAULT ON THE Liberty (1979) (Israeli attack
on U.S. Navy intelligence ship in 1967).
39. Note, supra note 11, at 1086.
40. Whether the Soviet Union will choose to destroy American spy satellites when it
becomes capable of doing so depends on Soviet national goals as conceived by the Soviet
leaders. For the purpose of a legal analysis, however, it is sufficient to observe that
whatever the Soviet Union does in this regard will not appear to be violative of interna-
tional law ....
Note, National Sovereignty of Outer Space, 74 HARV. L. Rlv. 1154, 1174 (1961).
41. See Lissitzyn, supra note 35, at 138, 140-42.
42. Personnel accredited to the United Nations and other international organizations gen-
erally receive only functional immunity. Note, A Comparison and Analysis of Immunities De-
fenses Raised by Soviet Nationals Indicted Under United States Espionage Laws, 6 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L L. 259, 276 (1980). Consular officials, although they formally perform services for the
sending state with the consent of the receiving state, receive only functional immunity. L.
LEE, supra note 31, at 246-47. Agents on special missions also receive only functional immu-
nity. See generally Ryan, The Status of Agents on Special Missions in Customary International
Law, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 157 (1978). Some writers have argued that diplomats too should




ties.43 Espionage is not considered to be within the scope of a state
agent's official duties.44 Soldiers under the command of a military officer
are non-diplomatic personnel.45 Therefore, they are entitled at most to
functional immunity and can be punished for their acts of espionage.
Neither the norms protecting state agents nor the norms justifying the
use of force address peacetime espiofnage by military liaison officers. Be-
cause international law lacks clear guidance, the relevant elites have gen-
erated norms concerning gathering state responsibility and the degree of
force available against spies that apply solely to military liaison espio-
nage. The norms they developed apparently sanctioned espionage by the
gathering state and protected the liaison officers against the use of lethal
force. Recent Soviet treatment of Western liaison officers, however, has
challenged these established norms, and the shooting of Major Nicholson
indicates that the elites continue to test the accepted practice. Only fu-
ture incidents will determine the status of this norm.
II. Facts
In 1947, the armies of the four states occupying Germany-the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France---established
through bilateral agreements Military Liaison Missions (MLM).46 These
agreements permit the signatories to station a limited number of their
officers in each occupation zone. The United States, the United King-
dom, and France share a mission in Potsdam. The Soviet Union has
missions in Bunde in the British zone, in Frankfurt in the American
zone, and in Baden Baden in the French zone.47 MLM personnel are
accredited directly to the commanders-in-chief of the army occupying
the zone in which they are stationed, and not to either West or East
Germany.48 They technically provide liaison between the Western and
Soviet armies.49 In order to perform these duties, MLM personnel pos-
43. Note, supra note 42.
44. See, ag., United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 79, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (official
duties do not include obtaining aerial photographs of defense installations). The receiving
state is free to define the scope of the agent's official duties. L. LEE, supra note 31, at 253-54.
Former practice denied non-diplomatic personnel immunity for serious crimes even though
committed in an official capacity. Id. at 255. There is little practical difference between the
two approaches. Id. at 256.
45. G. NASCIMENTO E SILVA, DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1972).
46. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is representative of
these agreements. Agreement on Military Liaison Missions Accredited to the Soviet and
United States Commanders in Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany, Apr. 7, 1947
(available from Bureau of Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State)
[hereinafter cited as Huebner-Malinin Agreement].
47. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1985, at 67.
48. Huebner-Malinin Agreement, supra note 46, para. 5.
49. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement describes the liaison's duties as follows:
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sess permanent travel passes for the zone in which they are stationed. 50
Although established specifically to assist in the post-war administration
of Germany, the MLM continue to operate under the original
agreements. 51
Practice under the agreements, including the Huebner-Malinin Agree-
ment between the United States and the Soviet Union, has been relatively
peaceful; however, the shooting of Major Nicholson was not the first use
of force against MLM personnel. In August, 1982, American liaison of-
ficers, eluding capture after entering a restricted zone, seriously injured a
Soviet soldier when their truck ran him over. The United States apolo-
gized for the accident. 52 In March, 1984, a French officer was killed on a
mission when his jeep was rammed head-on by a Soviet truck.5 3 The
Soviet Union dismissed the incident as a "road-accident. ' 54 Further-
more, Soviet soldiers have with increasing frequency beaten, fired "warn-
ing" shots at, and rammed the vehicles of Western MLM officers. 55
In each zone, the mission will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the inter-
ests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly, as well as in matters of
protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have the right
to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are
accredited.
Id. para. 14.
50. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identi-
cal permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of
travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones,
except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.
Id. para. 10.
51. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement does not specify any termination date. Nor does its
description of the MLM's duties necessarily imply such a date. See supra note 49. Since the
Agreement was part of the post-war accords, it might have been assumed that the four occupy-
ing powers were to terminate the Agreement when the formal occupation of Germany had
ceased. However, the U.S., U.K., and France have retained control over West Berlin. Con-
vention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May
26, 1952, United States-United Kingdom-France, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 4251, 4254, T.I.A.S. No.
3245, at 4. The Soviet Union contends that the post-war accords no longer apply to East
Berlin because it is the capital of the GDR. The Western allies maintain that the accords
apply to both East and West Berlin. See Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Sept. 3, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 283, T.I.A.S. No. 7551. Despite its position, the Soviet Union has not requested the
termination of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.
52. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A3, col. 4. For a Soviet account of the incident that
fails to mention the U.S. apology, see Pravda Version of Nicholson Shooting Incident, FBIS
(USSR), Mar. 28, 1985, at Al (text from Pravda, Mar. 27, 1985, at 5) [hereinafter cited as
Pravda Version].
53. Soviet Vehicle Rams French Patrol, Kills Officer, FBIS (W. Eur.), Mar. 30, 1984, at El
(GDR).
54. The Sunday Times (London), Mar. 31, 1985, at 24, col. 3.
55. British MLM officers have been shot at twice in recent years. The Times (London),
Mar. 27, 1985, at 5, col. 1. In August, 1982, a Soviet sentry fired at an American MLM patrol.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A3, col. 4. On May 19, 1982, Soviet troops detained American
MLM officers and beat them while their hands were tied behind their back. Wash. Post, Mar.
27, 1985, at A30, col. 1. For other examples of Soviet harassment, see id.; L.A. Times, Mar.
31, 1985, at VIII, col. 1. The increased friction in recent years may have resulted from the lack
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Although the Soviet Union and the United States disagreed over two
important facts in the Nicholson incident,5 6 they agreed on the basic de-
tails. On March 24, 1985, Major Arthur D. Nicholson and Sargeant Jes-
sie G. Schatz, both members of the American MLM, were on a
reconnaissance mission near Ludwigslust, GDR, seventy miles northwest
of Berlin and twenty-five miles from the FRG.57 They arrived at the
scene of the incident at approximately 3:30 pm in a jeep bearing U.S.
military plates and markings and containing electronic listening equip-
ment. Major Nicholson, wearing a regular military camoflauge field uni-
form and carrying a camera, left the jeep. Sgt. Schatz, the driver,
remained in the vehicle.58 Major Nicholson then began photographing
the interior of a nearby tank shed.5 9
A Soviet sentry guarding the building then fired three shots, one of
which struck Major Nicholson. Soviet troops appeared and kept Sgt.
Schatz in the jeep. A Soviet soldier with a first aid kit arrived at 4:20 pm
but did not attempt to help Nicholson until twenty minutes later. By
then Nicholson had already died. 60 The Soviets released Sgt. Schatz
within a few hours and turned over Nicholson's body to the American
mission later that day.
of political controls over Soviet troops stationed in the GDR. Bad Day at the Barricade, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at A26, col. 2.
56. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
57. The United States never detailed the purpose of the mission; however, Major Nichol-
son may have been trying to photograph a new Soviet tank gun-mount. The Sunday Times
(London), Mar. 31, 1985, at 24, col. 3; Nicholson Allegedly Looking for New Soviet Tank, FBIS
(USSR), Apr. 25, 1985, at Al (Tass report). Another possibility is that Nicholson's mission
was related to Soviet military exercises. Ludwigslust is a Soviet training ground, and the Sovi-
ets normally hold maneuvers there in the spring. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1985, at 67.
Furthermore, American MLM have increased their monitoring since the installation of short-
range nuclear missiles in the GDR. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, at All, col. 1.
58. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
59. Pravda Version, supra note 52. The Soviet Union claimed it possessed photographic
evidence that Nicholson had done this, Soviets Claim Film Evidence of Nicholson Spying, FBIS
(USSR), Apr. 29, 1985, at A2 (text from London Daily Telegraph), but it never released such
evidence.
The United States initially asserted that Nicholson had been merely walking about without
mentioning whether he had attempted to take photographs. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at
A4, col. 2. The United States soon acknowledged, however, that he had been photographing
the tank shed. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A3, col. 4. After debriefing Sgt. Schatz, Penta-
gon officials asserted that, contrary to the previous admission, Maj. Nicholson never reached
the shed. Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1985, at A22, col. 6. The State Department, however, refused
to release the contents of Sgt. Schatz's debriefing. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
60. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at A4, col. 2. General Zaitsev, the commander of Soviet
forces in the GDR, asserted that Nicholson did not bleed to death because he had "died almost
immediately." Soviets Claim Film Evidence of Nicholson Spying, supra note 59. Apart from
this isolated statement, however, the USSR did not rebut the claim that Nicholson had been
denied medical assistance.
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The United. States mission in West Berlin immediately lodged a
"strong protest" with the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin.61 In Washing-
ton, D.C., Reagan Administration officials protested to various Soviet
officials.62 The United States also took some minor retaliatory acts.
63
The Soviet Union likewise filed an immediate protest, demanding the
United States take "necessary measures for [the] strict fulfillment of the
1947 Agreement on Military Liaison Missions."
' 4
III. Conflicting Claims
The United States and the Soviet Union disagree over two facts in the
incident: first, whether Major Nicholson entered a restricted military
zone and second, whether the Soviet sentry gave any warnings before
firing. According to the Soviet Union, Major Nicholson had entered a
restricted zone clearly demarked by signs in both Russian and German. 65
The United States maintained, on the other hand, that the tank shed was
not in a restricted zone.66 The Soviets also asserted that the sentry had
fired warning shots. According to the Soviet Union:
Acting in strict compliance with military regulations the sentry demanded
in Russian and German that the stranger stop. When the latter failed to
comply and tried to flee the sentry fired a warning shot into the air. Since
the intruder did not stop even after this, the sentry had to use his weapon.
He fired and killed the intruder.
67
61. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at A4, col. 3.
62. Secretary of State Schultz summoned Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin both to
lodge a complaint and to demand an apology. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at 2, col. 1. This
meeting followed an earlier meeting between Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Richard Burt and Oleg Sokolov, the second-ranking Soviet embassy official. Id. The Depart-
ment of Defense summoned three Soviet military attaches for a reprimand. N.Y. Times, Mar.
29, 1985, at A8, col. 2.
63. The United States cancelled its official representation at the April 25 ceremony in Tor-
gau, GDR, celebrating the 40th anniversary of the joining of Soviet and American forces in
World War II. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, at All, col. 1. American MLM officers were
ordered not to socialize with Soviet soldiers in Potsdam. Id. The United States also prema-
turely terminated a West Coast tour by a Soviet military attache. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985,
at A3, col. 4. Finally, President Reagan cancelled plans to invite the Soviets to participate in a
joint space mission. Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1985, at A13, col. 6.
64. Pravda Version, supra note 52.
65. Id. Major Nicholson was fluent in Russian. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1985, at AI, col. 4.
Restricted areas are usually marked on the ground, and MLM maps indicate these areas as
well. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1985, at 67.
66. American officials first alleged that Major Nicholson had remained 300 to 500 yards
away from the nearest restricted zone. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at A4, col. 1. They subse-
quently clarified the U.S. position by stating that the area had temporarily been restricted but
that the ban had been lifted on February 20, 1985. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A3, col. 3.
After debriefing Sgt. Schatz, however, both Pentagon and State Department officials claimed
that the area had never even temporarily been designated a restricted zone. Wash. Post, Apr.
17, 1985, at A22, col. 6.
67. Tars: U.S. Responsible, FBIS (USSR), Mar. 26, 1985, at Al (Tass report).
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The United States rejected this account, contending instead that the sen-
try gave no warning before firing and fired so rapidly that Major Nichol-
son did not have time to retreat.
68
IV. Conflicting Conception of Lawfulness
In addition to adopting conflicting versions of the facts, the United
States and the Soviet Union asserted conflicting interpretations of the
norms governing MLM espionage. Neither country explicitly relied on
the traditional, and conflicting, norms governing the treatment of spies.6
9
Nor did either refer to the other's intelligence-gathering activities apart
from the MLM.70 Nonetheless, their positions reflect the conflicting
background norms: the U.S. position analogized MLM officers to diplo-
mats; the Soviet position invoked the target state's right to protect classi-
fied information.
A. American Conception of Lawfulness
The United States asserted a norm that denied state responsibility for
espionage by MLM personnel and prohibited the use of retaliatory force
by the target state against MLM officers. Relying on the Huebner-
Malinin Agreement and the practice of MLM personnel, the United
States denied it had committed a wrong and claimed that the Soviet
Union had acted improperly.
Emphasizing that Major Nicholson had never entered a restricted mil-
itary zone, the U.S. invoked point ten of the Agreement which entitles
MLM personnel to unlimited travel privileges outside such zones. 71 The
68. Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, 21 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. Doc. 503, 504 (Apr. 23, 1985).
69. See supra notes 16-45 and accompanying text. Nor did either state differentiate be-
tween wartime and peacetime espionage, although one Congressman refused to condemn the
shooting because relations with the Soviet Union were equivalent to "an actual state of war."
131 CONG. REc. H3070 (daily ed. May 9, 1985) (statement of Rep. Crockett). Although ac-
ceptance of that proposition would have affected the outcome of the incident, the participating
elites seemingly preferred not to transform the incident into a debate on the legal status of the
Cold War.
70. The United States could have pointed to many other Soviet acts of espionage directed
at the U.S. See Dudney & Kelly, The Great Superpower Spy War, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 29, 1984, at 38, 38-42. Since proportionality requires an equivalent and not identical
response, even the United States' unilateral use of its MLM for espionage could have been
justified. For example, the U.S. asserted that the Soviet Union's extensive espionage justified
the U-2 flights even though the Soviet Union did not conduct similar flights over the U.S.
Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, supra note 6, at 21.
By confining its analysis to mutual practice under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, however,
the United States evinced a desire to limit the implications of the incident.
71. See, eg., Informal Exchange with Reporters, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 362, 363
(Mar. 25, 1985) (President invoking Agreement). The House of Representatives expressed a
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United States maintained that MLM personnel were entitled to collect
military intelligence outside of these zones. Furthermore, the United
States argued that the practice of both Soviet and American MLM per-
sonnel legitimated the collection of clandestine information inside re-
stricted zones. MLM personnel routinely entered restricted zones to
photograph military installations, and their trucks usually contained
electronic listening devices. 72 Thus Pentagon officials stated that, "for-
mal military contacts take a secondary role to what is considered...
'licensed spying' and both teams have evolved into official intelligence
gatherers . . . 73
American officials repeatedly noted that Major Nicholson had fol-
lowed the standard procedures of American MLM officers on recon-
naisance missions and that there was nothing unusual about his actions.
His uniform and jeep were marked with U.S. military insignia, identify-
ing him as an American MLM officer. Like all MLM officers on patrol,
he carried a camera visibly and was unarmed. Thus, he was "acting in
accordance with procedures and practices which have been completely
normal and accepted for many years. He was acting in accordance with
the spirit and letter of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. . . "74 Thus
the United States contended that Major Nicholson had not committed a
wrong; therefore, the Soviet Union could not hold the U.S. responsible
for his attempted espionage.
The United States also maintained that the use of force against Major
Nicholson was unjustified. 75 This position viewed the immunity of
MLM officers for acts of espionage as an extension of the immunity ac-
corded recognized state agents. To support its position, the U.S. relied
on Soviet practice. Although Soviet troops impede the efforts of Ameri-
can liaison officers to obtain classified information by such actions as
blocking roads, American MLM officers patrol through the GDR daily
similar view in Resolution 125, condemning the shooting as "inconsistent with point 10 of the
Military Liaison Missions Agreement." 131 CONG. REc. H2241 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1985).
States generally accord diplomats freedom of movement in order to fulfill their duties. 2 C.
Hyde, supra note 17, § 432A. However, the United States did not invoke this general privi-
lege, relying instead on point 10.
72. In 1984 alone, Soviet MLM officers entered restricted zones in West Germany on at
least 99 missions. The Sunday Times (London), Mar. 31, 1985, at 24, col. 1. The Defense
Intelligence Agency, the intelligence branch of the Department of Defense, actually operates a
school in the American mission. The Times (London), Mar. 26, 1985, at 36, col. 1. For de-
scriptions of MLM reconnaisance missions, see L.A. Times, Mar. 31, 1985, at VIII, col. 2.
73. L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at 115, col. 3.
74. Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, supra note 68, at
503-04.





without harassment. 76 Moreover, this is true even if Western MLM of-
ficers enter a restricted zone.
In addition, the United States emphasized its treatment of Soviet
MLM personnel to support its conclusion that the use of lethal force was
prohibited. American troops must report all sightings of Soviet patrols.
They can detain these officers, but "when making [a] detention, no force
should be used or lives endangered. ' 77 Consistent with these orders,
American troops do not fire upon Soviet MLM officers who enter re-
stricted zones. For example, on March 20, 1985, less than one week
before Major Nicholson was shot, American soldiers detained three So-
viet MLM officers who had been performing reconnaissance activities
within a restricted zone. After a brief time, the Americans released them
unharmed. 78 Although the orders to the Soviet troops were never made
public, they presumably are the same.79 The United States argued that
this mutual practice generated a normative expectation that neither state
could employ lethal force to detain a MLM officer even if the officer
violated point ten of the Agreement by entering a restricted zone.
The protection afforded diplomats and uniformed soldiers supports the
U.S. position. Like diplomats, MLM officers are formally accredited
state agents. Their frequent patrols with regularized procedures should
generate a protected status.8 0 They wear uniforms on patrols and drive
conspicuously marked jeeps. Because it is very difficult to distinguish the
MLM from visiting friendly forces and because the Soviet Union has
76. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, at All, col. 3.
77. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A3, col. 3. The standing orders to American troops also
provide that they should detain Soviet MLM personnel:
A. If in a permanent restricted area, or temporary restricted area, within the former
U.S. Zone, but not on autobahns in such areas.
B. If S.M.L.M. personnel are observed photographing, sketching or observing U.S.
troop installations or activities in non-restricted areas, S.M.L.M. should be detained, pro-
vided the detention can be effected within the immediate vicinity of the installation or
activity. Once the S.M.L.M. vehicle departs the immediate vicinity' of an area of troop
disposition, detention is no longer authorized.
Id.
78. Three Soviets Detained During U.S. Exercises, FBIS (W. Eur.), Mar. 21, 1985, at Jl
(text from DPA Hamburg). In another incident on January 25, 1985, American troops safely
escorted to the Soviet mission three Soviet MLM officers caught photographing a NATO exer-
cise from a restricted area. Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1985, at A30, col. 2.
The American practice of detaining Soviet liaison officers without violence figured promi-
nently in the congressional condemnation of the shooting. See, eg., 131 CONG. RIc. H2245
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 1985) (statement of Rep. Rudd).
79. A Soviet statement asserted that Soviet troops are under orders not to fire upon Ameri-
can MLM officers. U.S. Using Nicholson Affair 'for Political Aims," FBIS (USSR), May 2,
1985, at A2 (text from Pravda). The United States assumed that these were the formal orders.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A3, col. 3.
80. Compare Delupis, supra note 6, at 57 (immunity for warships developed because their
patrols were common and regular).
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consented to their presence, an implied waiver of jurisdiction over MLM
personnel may be inferred.
B. Soviet Conception of Lawfulness
Although there is some question whether the shooting was acciden-
tal,"' the Soviet Union has always characterized the shooting as a deliber-
ate response consistent with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.
Furthermore, it distinguished between the right to shoot unidentified in-
truders and its intention not to use force against MLM officers. Despite
its broad validation of the use of force, the Soviet Union did not seek any
further retaliation against the U.S.
In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union insisted on a strict
interpretation of the Agreement. Because point ten of the Agreement
explicitly excepts "places of disposition of military units"8 2 and because
the Agreement does not list the gathering of military intelligence as a
duty of MLM personnel,8 3 the Soviet Union concluded that MLM of-
81. One source indicated that the sentry was absent from his post and panicked when he
saw Major Nicholson near the tank shed. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1985, at A7, col. 1. Given the
increasing incidence of Soviet harassment, see supra note 55 and accompanying text, the shoot-
ing may have resulted from official encouragement.
82. Huebner-Malinin Agreement, supra note 50. If a MLM officer wishes to visit such an
area, he must file a request with the Soviet forces. Id. Also, the accrediting army sometimes
invites liaison officers to observe military exercises, but even then it will restrict what the of-
ficers can observe. The Times (London), Mar. 26, 1985, at 36, col. 2. Recent protests have
reduced the number of restricted zones in the GDR, but they still cover one-half of its terri-
tory. In contrast, restricted zones cover only about one-fifth of the FRG. The Sunday Times
(London), Mar. 31, 1985, at 24, col. 1.
Despite the freedom of travel normally accorded diplomats, both the United States and the
Soviet Union restrict the travel privileges of each other's diplomats, with currently a quarter of
each country declared offilimits. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1986, at A5, col. 4. There is no reported
instance of a diplomat being killed because he entered a restricted area.
83. See supra note 49. This understanding is supported by the instructions given to the
first chief of the U.S. MLM. They provide:
The functions of the Mission will be to assist any US agency in its dealing with the
Soviet Headquarters, and to follow up Soviet execution of Quadripartite agreements, re-
porting to this headquarters any failure on the part of the Soviets to enforce such agree-
ments. Following are matters with which the Mission will deal, in addition to any other
matters specified by this headquarters:
a. Graves registration ....
b. Assist in securing permission for personnel to travel on compassionate leave in Soviet
controlled areas.
c. Secure witnesses for trial in the US Zone when witnesses reside in the Soviet Zone.
d. Extradite prisoners, either military or civilian, for trial in the US Zone.
e. Assist in efforts to protect US trains from pilferage in crossing the Soviet Zone.
f. Assist in the inter-zone transfer of prisoners of war.
g. Assist in improving relations between the military personnel of one Zone of Occupa-
tion with military personnel of the other Zone of Occupation in matters arising from the
inter-zonal travel, black market activities and border disputes and incidents.
Letter from Lt. Col. Calza to Brigadier General Hess, Chief of the American MLM, para. 4
(Apr. 29, 1947) (available from Bureau of Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S.
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ficers are not entitled to commit espionage with immunity. The Soviet
Union readily recognized that American MLM officers enter restricted
areas to obtain protected information even though it never admitted that
its officers did the same. Nonetheless, it refused to acknowledge that
such practice legitimated their espionage activities. Thus, according to
the Soviet version of the facts, Major Nicholson had violated the Agree-
ment by committing espionage in a restricted zone. Although the Agree-
ment provides some limited immunity,84 the Soviet Union was free to use
lethal force to protect its military secrets.
To further justify the shooting, the Soviet Union classified Major
Nicholson as an "unknown intruder. 85 This cast Nicholson as a spy
removed from any protection under the Agreement and permitted broad
retaliatory measures by the Soviet Union.86 Even the tone of Soviet
statements implied that Nicholson had acted improperly. Thus, the So-
viet account of the incident stated that, "wearing a camouflage suit,"
' 87
Major Nicholson "secretly approached" the shed.88 More importantly,
Dep't of State). These instructions also provide that the MLM will maintain a station in Berlin
"for the purpose of preparing and processing documents of a confidential nature." Id. para. 6.
This does not necessarily indicate that the officers were to commit espionage, for their listed
tasks could entail confidential matters.
84. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement endows the mission building with the full rights of
extraterritoriality, Huebner-Malinin Agreement, supra note 46, para. 13; provides immunity to
liaison courriers to their home army, id. para. 11(b); and assures communication with the
home army, id. paras. 1 l(a),(c).
85.
The actions of the Soviet sentry . . . were not taken against a member of the U.S.
military missions as such, but against an unknown intruder who was carrying out an
intelligence mission and did not comply with the warnings of the sentry, who was acting
in strict conformity with the military manuals.
So, under those circumstances, due to the very behavior of the U.S. serviceman, the
procedures could not be applied under which both sides did not use, do not use, and do
not intend to use weapons when apprehending and driving out members of the military
liaison missions.
USSR Embassy Press Release on Nicholson Shooting, FBIS (USSR), Apr. 23, 1985, at A2.
86. Although Major Nicholson had performed other reconnaisance missions, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 24, 1985, at A7, col. 1, the Soviet Union did not justify the shooting on these grounds. To
the extent the Soviet Union was aware of this, its position can be seen as confirming the norm
that a spy receives immunity by rejoining his army. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying
text.
87. Pravda Version, supra note 52. This allusion to the disguise requirement, however,
does not justify the shooting. A person in military clothing is not in disguise, and has a "com-
plete defense against a charge of spying." Note, supra note 8, at 439. A military camouflage
field uniform with U.S. military insignia-the uniform normally worn on patrols by American
MLM officers-and a similarly marked jeep would have identified Major Nicholson as a MLM
officer.
88. Pravda Version, supra note 52. Secrecy, however, is not a traditional element of a spy.
See, eg., Halleck, supra note 29, at 591 ("an enemy who comes within our lines, without
disguise or false pretenses, and seeks information, no matter how secretly, is no spy"). More-
over, if preventing the dissemination of harmful information is the guiding principle, then
secrecy should be irrelevant.
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by denying the legitimacy of the MLM's espionage function, the Soviet
Union implied that Nicholson had acted under false pretenses. Thus the
use of deadly force against Major Nicholson was an appropriate propor-
tionate response to prevent the dissemination of valuable military infor-
mation. Even though the Soviet Union denied that practice legitimated
the intelligence gathering of MLM personnel, it invoked such practice
under the Agreement in order to exonerate itself. It emphasized that in
conformity with accepted practice, it had posted warning signs and that
the sentry had given the requisite warnings before firing.89 Furthermore,
it quickly released Sgt. Schatz, respecting his privilege under Agreement
practice not to answer questions.
If the incident is analyzed in terms of the norms permitting the target
state to use lethal force to protect classified information, the Soviet
Union was jusitifed in shooting Major Nicholson. MLM personnel are
not diplomats; thus they lack immunity for their acts of espionage. Fur-
ther, Major Nicholson was attempting to obtain highly sensitive intelli-
gence concerning Soviet military capabilities, justifying the shooting as
an appropriate proportional measure in self-defense. Despite the poten-
tial harm of Major Nicholson's activities, the Soviet Union never claimed
that the United States had committed a wrong. Although the Soviet
Union said the U.S. was "responsible" for the incident,90 it never asked
for an apology or demanded any compensation. Thus the Soviet Union
too declined to find inter-state responsibility for the attempted espionage.
V. International Appraisal
Unlike previous incidents involving MLM personnel, the Nicholson
shooting received significant publicity. The United Kingdom and
France-the other states with MLM in the GDR-both condemned the
shooting. The U.K. viewed the shooting as provocative.91 France was
particularly angered because the Soviet Union had assured it after a
French MLM officer was killed the previous year that similar incidents
would not recur. 92 Nevertheless, neither continued to criticize the Soviet
Union even though the Soviet Union's asserted right to use force applied
to all MLM officers. Furthermore, the commanders-in-chief of the Brit-
89. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
90. See, eg., L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at 112, col. 1 (statement of B. Malakhov, Second
Secretary of Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.) ("The entire responsibility for what hap-
pened rests wholly on the appropriate U.S. authorities."); Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1985, at Al,
col. 6 (Gorbachev tells U.S. congressional delegation that U.S. responsible for the shooting).
91. The Times (London), Mar. 29, 1985, at 4, col. 3 (statement of Prime Minister
Thatcher).
92. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, at All, col. 1.
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ish and French armies stationed in West Germany declined to take any
retaliatory actions against Soviet MLM officers.
93
That the British and French condemnation came while the facts were
unsettled could suggest that their reaction was reflexive. However, it
may reflect their belief that the use of lethal force against MLM person-
nel is unwarranted under all circumstances. Nor is their subsequent si-
lence and refusal to retaliate necessarily an acceptance of the Soviet
position. Rather, it could indicate their perception that a sustained pub-
lic debate over the incident would not resolve the conflicting positions.
94
Furthermore, both France and the U.K. may have felt the United States
would adequately defend their claim.
The reaction of the elites on whose territory the MLM are stationed
also indicated a desire to downplay the incident. West German politi-
cians criticized the shooting but added the suggestion that the MLM be
dismantled.95 Significantly, officials of the GDR declined to comment on
the incident, stating that the officers were accredited to the Soviet
Union.
96
Other elites who were not direct participants did not respond vigor-
ously to the Nicholson incident. Any reaction tended to follow an East-
West line.97 Most states did not respond at all. Their silence suggests
that the incident did not implicate norms beyond the Huebner-Malinin
93. Id.
94. Western MLM officers, who did not express surprise at the shooting, speculated that
the incident would "blow over quickly." The Times (London), Mar. 27, 1985, at 5, col. 2.
Admiral Carrol, former Chief of Staff of NATO's Supreme Allied Command Europe, also
expressed no surprise that an MLM officer had been killed. Nicholson Allegedly Looking for
New Soviet Weapon, FBIS (USSR), Apr. 25, 1985, at Al (text from British Observer).
95. See, e.g., SPD's Vogel Decries Shooting of U.S. Officer, FBIS (W. Eur.), Mar. 26, 1985,
'at J1 (FRG). However, the West German response was accompanied by a suggestion that the
MLM be dismantled. FDP Spokesman Suggests Ending Military Missions, FBIS (W. Eur.),
Mar. 29, 1985, at J7 (interview with H. Shaefer).
96. Foreign Ministry Declines Comment on U.S. Shooting, FBIS (E. Eur.), Mar. 26, 1985,
at El (statement by GDR Foreign Ministry).
97. Soviet allies adopted the Soviet version of the facts and faulted the U.S. for the provoc-
ative act. See, eg., Rude Pravo Cited on Ludwigslust Incident, FBIS (E. Eur.), Mar. 28, 1985,
at D5 (Czech.) ("The tragic result of the affair is regrettable, but at the same time it is an
accusation of those American circles which are behind such espionage actions, grossly violat-
ing respective international agreements, this time a 1947 agreement on military liaison mis-
sions."); Major Nicholson "Seriously Violated" Rules, FBIS (E. Eur.), Mar. 27, 1985, at D1
(Czech.) (statement by M. Rakowski) ("Major Nicholson and his companion seriously violated
the valid agreement concerning military liaison missions."); U.S. Military "Spy"Killed in Pots-
dam, FBIS (Lat. Am.), Mar. 28, 1985 (Cuba) (Havana Domestic Service report) ("The dead
spy. . . entered the enclosed military area in violation of posted signs. He was surprised by a
Soviet guard, who ordered him to halt. The officer tried to hide, did not heed warnings, and
was finally killed when he tried to escape.").
Western elites generally supported the U.S. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at All, col. 3
(diplomats say shooting reveals Soviet obsession for secrecy). Some who criticized the shoot-
ing also criticized the U.S. response. See, e.g., Will, When Murder Becomes an "Episode,"
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Agreement. Since MLM espionage does not fit into the traditional cate-
gories of spying, any governing norms are inapplicable to other contexts.
The incident did not affect their interests, and there was no reason for
them to influence their actions in unrelated espionage incidents.
VI. Outcome
After their initial protests,9 the United States and the Soviet Union
quickly agreed to hold a series of meetings between General Otis, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the U.S. army stationed in Europe, and General Zait-
sev, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet army in the GDR. The purpose
of these meetings was to resolve "this entire matter and also to consider
possible measures to prevent [future] incidents. . . ."99 Only one meet-
ing between Otis and Zaitsev was held, however, because the two sides
failed to agree on the appropriate use of force against MLM officers. The
United States claimed that the Soviet Union had promised during the
meeting not to use deadly force, 100 but the Soviet Union denounced this
characterization of its position. 101 As a result, the United States failed to
achieve any of its stated objectives from the meeting: agreemenit on the
facts, 102 an apology or compensation, 103 and punishment of the sentry. 104
Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 1985, at A17, col. 2; O'Sullivan, If America Had Pulled the Trigger, The
Times (London), Mar. 30, 1985, at 12, col. 6.
Other states, however, blamed neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. and urged restraint. See,
e.g., Politika: Ludwigslust Shows Need for Restraint, FBIS (E. Eur.), Mar. 29, 1985, at Ill
(Yugo.) (Tanjug report) ("The tragic incident at Potsdam could be a useful moral for the main
protagonists of the European and world military-espionage race-rivalry is becoming more
and more dangerous, calming down is more and more essential . .
98. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
99. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1985, at A19, col. 1 (statement of Ambassador Dobrynin).
100. The State Department reported that the Soviets had promised "that they will not
permit the use of force or weapons against the members of our liaison missions in the future."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at A12, col. 5.
101. "The assertion that the Soviet side allegedly. . . renounced the right to take legiti-
mate steps provided for by the military manuals does not correspond to the facts." USSR
Embassy Press Release on Nicholson Shooting, FBIS (USSR), Apr. 23, 1985, at A1-2 (Soviet
Embassy press release).
102. Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1985, at A13, col. 5.
The two could have consented to "fictitious facts" for purposes of negotiation while continu-
ing to assert publicly their own version. The United States and North Korea did this to resolve
the USS Pueblo incident. See Rubin, supra note 38, at 962-65. However, the Soviet Union
undoubtedly perceived no advantage in adopting the American version of the incident for the
meetings.
103. General Zaitsev stated that he lacked authority to discuss either issue. L.A. Times,
Apr. 17, 1985, at I1, col. 6. An unidentified Pentagon official stated, however, that he believed
"the United States had got as much as it was likely to receive from the Soviet side." N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at A12, col. 6.
The House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the President to expel Soviet Am-
bassador Dobrynin unless the Soviet Union apologized by June 1, 1985. 131 CONG. REc.
H3067, H3071 (daily ed. May 9, 1985). The Reagan Administration thought such action "un-
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Even though the Soviet Union and the United States continued to disa-
gree over the use of force, the shooting did not seriously disrupt Soviet-
American relations. The United States expelled a Soviet military attache
to protest the failure of the Otis-Zaitsev meeting,105 but avoided wide
political and economic sanctions. Unlike the KAL incident when the
U.S. terminated negotiations for a summit, the United States continued
arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. 10 6 The American at-
titude towards the Otis-Zaitsev meeting demonstrated its desire to down-
play the incident. Not only did the United States mildly respond to the
dispute over the meeting, but also it did not precondition the talks on a
Soviet apology.107 It was even reluctant to discuss the meeting with the
press. 10
8
The Soviet Union too sought to avoid any serious rupture in its rela-
tions with the U.S. Although the Soviet Union normally responds to an
expulsion of one of its diplomats by expelling a diplomat of the other
state, 10 9 the Soviet Union did not retaliate for the expulsion of its mili-
tary attache. This failure to respond could be construed as a Soviet ad-
mission that the American account of the Otis-Zaitsev meeting was
accurate. More likely, it reflects a Soviet desire not to impair relations
wise and inappropriate." 131 CONG. REc. H3361 (daily ed. May 21, 1985) (statement of State
Dep't spokesman Djerejian).
104. There were unconfirmed reports that the sentry had been arrested. FRG TV- Soldier
Arrested for Nicholson Killing, FBIS (USSR), Apr. 12, 1985, at A2 (Hamburg ARD television
news report). However, General Zaitsev stated that "no fault lies with the Soviet soldier ....
We cannot punish him." Soviets Claim Film Evidence of Nicholson Spying, supra note 59.
Western observers viewed the leak as a disinformation ploy to mute criticism. The Times
(London), Apr. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 7. Punishment of the sentry would be wildly inconsistent
with Soviet statements and actions.
105. Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1985, at A14, col. 1.
106. One State Department official observed that the U.S. was "trying to avoid turning this
into another K.A.L. affair." N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at All, col. 1. President Reagan, in
one of his few public comments on the shooting, said it made him anxious for a summit.
Informal Exchange with Reporters, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 362, 363 (Mar. 25, 1985).
For a discussion of the repurcussions of the KAL incident, see, e.g., Morgan, The Downing of
Korean Air Lines Flight 007, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 231 (1985). Also, during the U-2 incident,
Krushchev cancelled the then ongoing Paris Summit. For an account of the U-2 incident, see,
e.g., 2 W. MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 1061-71 (1973).
107. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, however, argued that the Soviet Union should apol-
ogize before the United States participated in any talks. L.A. Times, Apr. 17, at 115, col. 3.
He did not suggest, however, that the shooting should interfere with the arms control discus-
sions. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at All, col. 1.
108. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at A12, col. 5.
109. The Soviet Union will do this either to protest an abusive expulsion or to avoid the
appearance of acknowledging fault. For example, during the incident, the United Kingdom
expelled several Soviet representatives involved in espionage. The Soviet Union responded by
expelling several British representatives on the same grounds. ExPuLSIONS OF SOVIETS, supra
note 7, at 2; In the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pravda, Apr. 25, 1985, at 4, reprinted in
CUR. DIG. Sov. PREss, May 22, 1985, at 109.
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with the U.S. over the incident. 10 In addition, the Soviet Union never
suggested that the arms control talks be cancelled, and it even agreed to
continue talks on various issues concerning human rights.I' Finally, the
tone of Soviet statements concerning the incident was not harsh,1 2 and
the content of these statements was sometimes conciliatory.
113
The failure of the Otis-Zaitsev meeting to reconcile the conificting U.S.
and Soviet positions could suggest that MLM officers are not entitled to
any immunity. The Soviet Union never apologized for the shooting nor
undertook any actions that indicated an intention not to use deadly force
again against MLM officers. The Soviet assertion that it was unaware
that Major Nicholson was a MLM officer appears disengenuous, and in
the future, other MLM officers, despite their military insignia, may un-
wittingly become "unknown intruders." Although the Soviet Union at-
tempted to mute criticism of the shooting, its efforts seem to have been
an attempt to avoid a rift with the U.S. rather than a tacit promise not to
use lethal force against MLM patrols. In fact, Soviet troops still occa-
sionally harass Western MLM officers.11 4 As for the United States, it did
not strenuously seek a Soviet apology. Instead, its attention was directed
towards preventing other shootings.
110. When the U.S. expelled the attache, it cautioned the Soviet Union that it did "not
wish to get into a fruitless cycle of retaliation and counterretaliaton." L.A. Times, Apr. 27,
1985, at I1, col. 1. Two months later, the Soviet Union did cancel a meeting between Soviet
and American naval officers, but only after the U.S. cancelled the social events normally ac-
companying the meeting. Wash. Post, June 20, 1985, at A28, col. 1. These talks, held annu-
ally under the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, May 25,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. No. 7379, aim to develop rules of conduct to prevent collisions
between American and Soviet ships as the result of intimidating conduct, thus paralleling the
Otis-Zaitsev meeting. Neither side had ever cancelled these talks, not even during the KAL
incident. Wash. Post, June 20, 1985, at A28, col. 1.
111. Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1985, at A18, col. 1.
112. Unlike Soviet accounts of the KAL downing, the Soviet Union described the incident
as "regrettable" and only briefly described the facts. Nor did the reports in Pravda carry the
standard headings indicating high authority of origin. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at Al1, col.
3. Some believed this demonstated the Soviet Union's intent to downplay the shooting. Wash.
Post, Mar. 27, 1985, at A30, col. 2.
113. For example, during a meeting with U.S. Congressmen, Gorbachev reportedly said
"that a change in the ground rules governing U.S. and Soviet military liaison officers in Ger-
many 'could very well be the outcome' of Nicholson's death and that 'it should never happen
again.'" Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
114. On June 4, 1985, a British MLM patrol was chased and rammed by a Soviet truck
even though the patrol was three miles from a restricted zone. The Soviets threw bricks and a
shovel at the patrol and held the British officers at gunpoint for several hours. The Times
(London), June 8, 1985, at 1, col. 4. The British lodged a complaint that the Soviet Union
merely "noted." The Times (London), June 11, 1985, at 8, col. 4. British sources added that
the U.K. did not expect an apology. Id. On September 7, 1985, a Soviet truck rammed a U.S.
MLM vehicle entangled in barbed wire near a Soviet military installation, injuring one Ameri-
can officer. The Soviets briefly detained the officers and never apologized for the incident.
L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1985, at 14, col. 1. There has been no significant international response
to the continuing friction.
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It would be premature, however, to interpret the outcome as denying a
protected status to MLM officers. Although there has always been fric-
tion between Soviet troops and Western MLM personnel, countless
MLM patrols have occurred since 1947 without interference. Only re-
cently has the incidence of violence increased. Therefore, the U.S. expec-
tation concerning the safety of MLM officers was well-founded, but U.S.
elites probably viewed broad sanctions as unproductive. Instead, the
United States maintained that preserving normal relations with the
U.S.S.R. would best protect MLM officers.
115
Significantly, the Soviet Union too has avoided the maximum assertion
of its claim. Because the shooting of Major Nicholson was the first inci-
dent involving MLM personnel to generate significant publicity, the So-
viet Union may have asserted an extreme claim to avoid public
acknowledgement of fault. Furthermore, the Soviet Union never re-
quested that the U.S. dismantle its MLM. This suggests that the Soviet
Union benefits from its MLM and the U.S. disavowal of force. There-
fore, it will not provoke the U.S. into using force or terminating the
Agreement. Since the incident, Western MLM personnel have continued
to patrol throughout the GDR,116 and only two instances of excessive
violence have been reported.117 Thus despite the Soviet Union's position,
most MLM patrols remain unmolested.
118
Although the incident failed to generate any agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union, the continued operation of the liai-
son missions indicates that the outcome satisfactorily served the interests
of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the elites are test-
ing the accepted norm, only future incidents will determine the immunity
of MLM officers.
VII. Writer's Appraisal
Although the United States and the Soviet Union disagreed over the
protection accorded MLM personnel, they reinforced the norm that espi-
115. See, eg., Interview with Lou Cannon, Dave Hoffman, and Lynn Downie of the
Washington Post, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 397, 398 (Apr. 1, 1985).
116. N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1985, at 2, col. 6.
117. See supra note 114.
118. Furthermore, the Soviet Union still accords immunity to American diplomats ac-
cused of espionage. Since the Nicholson shooting, the Soviet Union has expelled unharmed
two American diplomats accused of committing espionage. Pravda, June 15, 1985, at 6, re-
printed in CUR. DIG. SOy. PRESS, July 10, 1985, at 18 (P. Stombach, Second Secretary at U.S.
Embassy in Moscow); N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1986, at 3, col. 2 (M. Sellers, Second Secretary at
U.S. Embassy in Moscow). Because these expulsions occurred long after the U.S. expulsion of
the Soviet military attache, see supra text accompanying note 105, it is unlikely that the Soviet
expulsions were in retaliation for the U.S. expulsion.
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onage does not justify broad inter-state retaliation by the target state.
Unlike the KAL and U-2 incidents, the shooting of Major Nicholson did
not provoke a major East-West crisis. The reinforcement of this norm
has a positive effect on world order, for it enables states to obtain intelli-
gence about each other without any deleterious effect on their overall
diplomatic relations. World order requires rational decisionmaking,
which in turn requires full information. Elites should therefore generate
norms which facilitate the exchange of intelligence, rather than act with
a dangerous lack of information.' 19 With the existence of a closed Soviet
society and of mutual distrust between the United States and the Soviet
Union, MLM espionage can provide information necessary for planning.
Furthermore, as an institutionalized mechanism, the MLM can provide a
regular exchange of information.120 Although the MLM's cannot satisfy
either state's entire intelligence needs, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have
recognized a common interest in their operation.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to use the
MLM to collect classified information. Although the issue of the appro-
priate use of force remains unsettled, the Nicholson incident suggests its
resolution can occur without impeding their diplomatic relations. This
mutual desire to test the operating norms without disrupting their rela-
tions ultimately promotes world order. It is hoped, however, that in the
future, challenges to this remote and dark profession will occur without
individual tragedy for the MLM officers.
119. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 9, at 432-33. See also V. VAN DYKE,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 349-50 (2d ed. 1966) (discussing need to structure intelligence
gathering to problem solving). Professor Falk has argued that unilateral acts of espionage
destabilize world order because in the absence of centralized ordering techniques, their legiti-
macy can only be resolved through extreme assertions of national power: the gathering state
will spy, and the target state will shoot back. Furthermore, if the target state feels its weak-
nesses have been dangerously uncovered, it might be tempted to a first strike before the gather-
ing state can assimilate the information. Falk, Space Espionage and World Order: A
Consideration of the Samos-Midas Program, in ESSAYS AND ESPIONAGE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 45, 55-57, 61 (R. Stanger ed. 1962). Although perhaps overstated, this argument high-
lights the need for shared exchanges of information.
120. Whether particular information promotes stability depends on its use to the gathering
state. Military intelligence can document an opponent's offensive capabilities and indicate its
hostile intent. This enables countermeasures and reduces the risk of surprise attack. In fact,
some argued that protection from a surprise attack was the MLM's primary function. The
Times (London), Mar. 27, 1985, at 5, col. 1. However, military intelligence can also expose a
state's weaknesses, tempting the gathering state to the use of force. These two uses have been
labelled the "red light function" and "green light function" respectively. Stone, supra note 7,
at 41-43. A regularized mechanism providing a constant exchange of intelligence lessens the
green light function by minimizing unanticipated developments that leave some actors
unprepared.
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